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Abstract 
This paper analyzes how domestic government sets its optimal export policy in a 
duopoly model when its domestic firm can only outsource its input while the rival 
firm is able to both produce and outsource its input. First we analyze the strategic 
outsourcing behavior of the foreign firm. We find that the foreign firm’s decisions on 
whether to outsource input or to make it by itself depend on the trade policy taken 
by the domestic government.  The foreign firm will strategically outsource the entire 
quantity of its input production to the supplier with an input price higher than its in-
house cost, if the domestic firm is subsidized by the domestic government. 
However, when the domestic firm is being charged a positive export tax by the 
domestic government, the foreign firm will decide to make input by itself despite the 
lower input price under the outsourcing regime. From the domestic government’s 
point of view, we find that the conditions for the foreign firm’s decisions correspond 
to the domestic social welfare maximization problem. When the foreign firm 
chooses to outsource its input to the supplier, the domestic government will impose 
a negative export tax on its firm, namely subsidy. While when the foreign firm 
chooses to make input by itself, the domestic government will impose an export tax 
on its firm as trade policy. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Outsourcing activities have been growing recently in industrial organizations. 
Not only nationally, it also occurs internationally. Nowadays, every part of product 
is being outsourced. The benefits of outsourcing are among cost saving incentive1 
and globalization2. Organizations find that costs can be cut down by outsourcing 
one or more business processes. 
An example of national outsourcing is the case of Mitsubishi and Honda.3 
Mitsubishi outsources its Gasoline Direct Injection (GDI) engines to Fiat Auto. 
Mitsubishi GDI engines would power several new Fiat models. Honda is famous for 
its unique and superior Direction of Crankshaft Rotation (DCR) engines, but the 
company decided to give up its DCR engine and instead outsource the traditional 
GDI engines to its rivals. 
Another example of international outsourcing is “American” car that only 37% of 
the production value of a representative American car is generated domestically in 
the US. They outsource 30% of the car’s value to Korea for assembly, 17,5% to 
Japan for components and advanced technology, 7,5% to Germany for design, 4% 
to Taiwan and Singapore for minor parts, 2,5% to the United Kingdom for 
advertising and marketing services and 1,5% to Ireland and Barbados for data 
processing4. 
There are two main motivations of outsourcing. First, outsourcing is a way for 
firms to seek cheaper suppliers, thus reduces production costs (Zhao, 2001). 
Second, outsourcing can be used for strategic considerations, such as for 
increasing rival’s cost (Arya et al 2008), for obtaining a collusive effect (Chen, et.al. 
2004) and Buehler and Haucap (2006), for market dominance (Chen, 2007), etc. 
There exists a large literature now that analyzes the government behavior when 
facing international trade in globalization. Numerous papers analyzing strategic 
trade policies that focus on the horizontal aspects of market structures have been 
published5. In the case of vertically related markets, the behavior of government in 
setting trade policy on intermediate input and final product is analyzed by 
Bernhofen (1997), Ishikawa and Spencer (1999), Grossman and Helpman (2002), 
Qiu and Spencer (2002), Shy and Stenbacka (2003), Chen et al. (2004), and 
Skaksen (2005). In the case of international outsourcing, related research was 
conducted by Grossman and Helpman (2005), Chen (2007), Mukherjee and Tsai 
(2010).  
 Brander and Spencer (1985) is the pioneer of a third-country duopolistic model 
and show that the optimal export policy is a subsidy. Then, Eaton and Grossman 
                                                          
1 See Grossman and Helpman (2002) 
2 See Grossman and Helpman (2005) and  McLaren (2000) 
3 This example of outsourcing by using the case of Mitsubishi and Honda is given by Chen (2004). 
4 Grossman and Helpman (2005) citing Annual report of Wold Trade Organization (1998) 
5  For example, Brander and Krugman (1983), Dixit (1984), Brander and Spencer (1985), and Eaton 
and Grossman (1986). 
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(1986) analyze the welfare effects of trade and industrial policy under oligopoly and 
show that the optimal export policy is a tax. Bernhofen (1997) analyzes the role of 
a monopolist input supplier with linear demand and find that the optimal trade 
policy depends on the input price, such that the government will subsidize the 
domestic firm under price discrimination and impose export tax under uniform 
pricing.  Ghosh et al., (2008) analyze strategic trade policy when technology is 
transferable via licensing and show that under Cournot competition, the optimal 
policy can be an export tax instead of an export subsidy. Ara and Ghosh (2016) 
analyze how bargaining power affects trade policy and find that when the home 
firms have full bargaining power, the optimal tariff becomes negative, namely 
subsidy. 
The increase in international outsourcing has attracted attention of researcher. 
Chen (2007) is one of some literature related to outsourcing and trade.  This paper 
investigates the cause of outsourcing other than cost reduction and strategic 
outsourcing, namely market dominance. The policy implication of the results 
derived in this paper is that apart from cost reduction, a firm trying to outsource 
abroad might be expecting to gain an advantage over its rivals through the subsidy 
on the intermediate good offered by the government in host country. Mukherjee 
and Tsai (2010) have shown that an international outsourcing can be employed as 
an entry deterring strategy. Their paper also finds that such outsourcing is also 
welfare reducing for the outsourcing country.  
The integration of trade and the disintegration of production are the two most 
important features in the contemporary global economy (Feenstra, 1998).  
Globalization has led to international outsourcing such that businesses nowadays 
engage in purchasing intermediate inputs from affiliating foreign firms. We are 
facing a new era of trade. There exists integration between countries in the world 
economy such that countries engage one another in producing final goods directly 
and indirectly. In facing this, governments must consider welfare implications of 
alternative trade policies they take. The focus should shift from protecting sectors 
to improving access to its inputs and materials and to developing politics that 
promote human capital development, innovation, and all things that increase 
productivity (Pengestu et al 2015).  
Traditional theory says that outsourcing is based on cost saving consideration 
only. But it turns out there is another important motivation of outsourcing namely 
strategic consideration. Since globalization has involved more countries in a trade, 
firms now are facing more competitive market both nationally and internationally. 
How do governments respond to this development? In most of the trade activities, 
of course governments must take certain policies to regulate the trade, including to 
protect and to help its company. 
To the best of our knowledge there is still no paper analyzing how domestic 
government sets its optimal export policy when it faces strategic outsourcing by 
foreign firm. By combining Arya, et.al.'s (2008) and Bernhofen (1997) model to a 
three-firms trade framework, we consider a vertically integrated foreign firm which 
compete with a domestic downstream firm in the third country market, and 
meanwhile a monopolistic input supplier stands outside the three countries. We 
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use this trade model to examine the strategic trade policy of the domestic country 
government, when the foreign firm can either strategically outsource the entire 
quantity of its input production or make it by itself.  
We obtain the following main results. First, the foreign firm will strategically 
outsource its input despite the higher input price under the outsourcing regime, if 
the domestic firm is subsidized by the domestic government. Second, the foreign 
firm will decide to make input by itself despite the lower input price under the 
outsourcing regime, if the domestic firm is being charged a positive export tax by 
the domestic government. Third, the domestic government will impose a negative 
export tax on its firm, namely subsidy when the foreign firm strategically outsources 
its input production. This subsidy is aimed to help the domestic market in 
competing in the final product market. These results are different with Bernhofen’s 
(1998) which finds that the government will subsidize the domestic firm under price 
discrimination and impose export tax under uniform pricing. Using our model with 
uniform input price setting, we find that the government will subsidize the domestic 
firm under certain conditions.  Fourth, under the making regime, the domestic 
government will impose a positive export tax on its firm. This is because the 
domestic firm has obtained benefit from the lower input price under the making 
regime, hence the domestic government will charge an export tax to take 
advantage of the international trade. 
This paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we provide related literature. 
We introduce the basic model in section 3 and conduct the analysis to find the 
main results in section 4. We conclude the results of the paper in section 5. 
 
2. RELATED LITERATURE 
When a business organization decides to outsource input instead of doing in-
house input production, the motivation is usually to get the input from outside at a 
lower cost. Grossman and Helpman (2002) find that the cost of vertically integrated 
firm can be very high because of incomplete contract and complexity of the 
organization. However outsourcing also incurs costs in searching the appropriate 
partner. By outsourcing the input, supplier maximizes its profits in which it shares 
but compromises its bargaining power with the outsourcer. McLaren (2000) studies 
the impact of international opening up on the vertical integration decision. Antras 
and Helpman (2004) analyze the decision to outsource from foreign or domestic 
suppliers. There is a trade-off between selecting partners that is from the south 
which has a lower variable cost and the north which has a lower fixed cost.  
Another motivation of outsourcing is not because that in-house production is 
costlier, but rather because outsourcing gives some strategic advantages that 
benefit the firm. Shy and Stenbacka (2003) analyze how the degree of competition 
in the final goods market affects the incentive to outsource production of key 
components. Arya, et.al. (2008) investigate strategic outsourcing under a 
framework that includes upstream firms. The paper shows that even though the 
firm which can produce input by itself incurs a cost less than the input price 
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charged by the input supplier, it will outsource for strategic advantages which is 
obtained through the raise in its rival’s cost. Mukherjee and Tsai (2010) have 
shown that an international outsourcing can be employed as an entry deterring 
strategy. Such outsourcing is also welfare reducing for the outsourcing country. 
Kabiraj and Sinha (2014) analyze strategic outsourcing based on a new dimension 
of technology transfer. The strategic outsourcing from the softening competition in 
the final goods market and the benefit in turn accrues through a payment for the 
patent sale to the independent input supplier. Chen, et.al. 2004 identify a strategic 
outsourcing which occurs with collusive effect when a domestic firm outsources to 
a more efficient foreign competitor. 
 
3. THE BASIC MODEL 
We follow Brander and Spencer (1985) by considering a framework with two 
firms in the downstream market, denoted by firm F and firm D. Both firms are 
located respectively in foreign country and in domestic country. Firm F is a 
vertically integrated firm competing with firm D in the linear final goods market in 
the third country. An outside firm, firm U, is an upstream firm which only produces 
inputs with marginal cost uc . To simplify the analysis we assume that the production 
cost of firm U equals to zero.  
The downstream firms produce homogeneous final products with certain 
production costs. One unit of final product requires one unit of intermediate input. 
To produce the final goods, firm F can produce intermediate goods by itself with a 
fixed marginal cost c , while firm D has to purchase inputs from the upstream firm 
U. For the sake of simplicity, intermediate input tariffs are ignored. 
The regime will be classified into the making and the outsourcing regime, 
depending on firm F’s decision, whether to outsource input from firm U with unit 
price w  or to produce input by itself. We denote   as an exogenous variable which 
serves as firm F’s homemade ratio. Thus, it outsources inputs to the upstream firm 
U in proportion of 1  and makes part of the input itself in proportion of  . 
Firm F and firm D export their products to the third country under assumption 
that all of the aforementioned countries belong to an international trade union 
which allows them to freely trade without any barrier. We further assume that both 
downstream firms only sell their product and compete in the third country market. 
The objective of the domestic country’s government is to maximize social 
welfare in its country by setting trade policy. It decides whether it would offer an 
export subsidy or charge an export tax to its domestic firms. 
The game involves a sub-game perfect equilibrium with four decision stages. In 
the first stage, the domestic government decides a strategic trade policy. The input 
supplier sets input price w  in the second stage. Firm F makes a decision either to 
buy the input from the supplier or to make the input by itself in the third stage. 
Finally the downstream firms compete under Cournot fashion in the fourth stage. 
The model is solved by using backward induction. 
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We start from the fourth stage, in which both of the downstream firms choose 
their quantities simultaneously. The objective functions of both of the firms are 
given by: 
   ,1 ff qtwcP    (1.1) 
  dd qswP  . (1.2) 
where the superscript “ f ” and “ d ” are used to denote the foreign and domestic 
firm respectively. Firm F incurs t  and firm D incurs s  which are export taxes 
charged by their each government. The quantity of final product produced by each 
firm is denoted by q . 
By deriving the first order conditions for the profit maximization problems, we 
obtain the reaction functions of both firms as follows: 
  ,0121 


twcqq
q
df
f
f


 (2.1) 
.021 


swqq
q
df
d
d  (2.2) 
Solving the reactions function simultaneously results in the following equilibrium 
outputs of both firms: 
 
,
3
21221* twcsq f



 
(3.1) 
 
.
3
121* twcsqd



 
(3.2) 
 
4. T
HE MAIN RESULTS 
In the third stage the upstream supplier sets the input prices that it will charge. 
The profit function of firm U is given by: 
  .1 fdu qqw    (4) 
By substituting the equilibrium outputs in (3.1) and (3.2) to the firm U’s objective 
function in (4), differentiating it with respect to w  and setting the first order 
condition equals to zero,  we obtain the input price in equilibrium as follows: 
 
.
14
222
*
2
2




 tcstcs
w  (5) 
Note that the optimal input price under the outsourcing regime is higher than 
that under the making regime under assumption that c  is larger than t  with 
insignificant difference, i.e  1 sc . Substituting (5) into the equilibrium outputs in 
(3.1) and (3.2) reveals that the optimal quantity and profits of firm F and firm D are 
as follows: 
 
 ,27554722444
112
1 22223
2
* 

 tsstcsctcq f 
  
(6.1) 
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 
 ,2755105557252
112
1 22223
2
* 

 ststcstccqd 
  
(6.2) 
 
  ,27554722444
112
1
2
22223
2
*








 tsstcsctcf 


 
(7.1) 
 
  .2755105557252
112
1
2
22223
2
*








 ststcstccd 


 
(7.2) 
In the second stage the foreign firm decides whether to outsource its 
intermediate input from firm U or to produce input by its self. We consider two 
extreme cases, namely outsourcing regime  0 and making regime  1 . 
Under outsourcing regime, we substitute  0  into the quantities and profits 
in (6.1) until (7.2), then we find the final optimal quantity and profit of each 
downstream firm: 
 ,275
12
1*  tsqOf  (8.1) 
  ,275
12
1
2
*






 tsOf  (8.2) 
 ,275
12
1*  stqOd  (9.1) 
  .275
12
1
2
*






 stOd  (9.2) 
Under the making regime, i.e. when  1  we find the following quantities and 
profits in equilibrium: 
 ,7735
12
1
tcsqMf   (10.1) 
 
2
* 7735
12
1






 tcsMf  (10.2) 
 ,2422
12
1
 stcqMd  (11.1) 
  .2422
12
1
2
*






 stcMd  (11.2) 
From (8.2) and (10.2), we find that the difference between firm F’s profit under 
the outsourcing and the making regime is: 
 csMf
O
f 738
144
1**    
We can see that  
** M
f
O
f    if   *783 csc  . This upper bound of c  
implies that firm F will outsource its input to firm U if and only if *cc  , otherwise it 
will make its own input. In other words, the decision of firm F over the making or 
the outsourcing regime will depend on its marginal cost under the making regime. 
Strategic Trade Policy in The Presence of Outsourcing 
(Damiana Simanjuntak and Doriani Lingga) 
 
 
221 
First, consider the case of *cc   such that firm F chooses outsourcing and 
takes w  as given by firm U. When the input price is lower than the cost under the 
making regime, i.e  cwO  , it is a straightforward decision for firm F to choose 
outsourcing and no further explanation is needed. However, a striking outcome is 
found when  cwO   yet firm F still decides to outsource, that is when 
 tcss  22~ . For any positive value of c  and t  we know that s~ is negative 
which refers to subsidy. This result is summarized as: 
 
Proposition 1 
The foreign firm will strategically outsource its input despite the higher input 
price under the outsourcing regime, if the domestic firm is subsidized by the 
domestic government. 
 
The intuition behind this result is as follows. Remember that the optimal input 
price under the outsourcing regime is higher than that under the making regime. 
The foreign firm can take this opportunity to raise its rival’s production cost. It could 
have produced its own input with a lower cost as compared to that under 
outsourcing. However, knowing that the domestic firm is being subsidized, the 
foreign firm will decide to outsource its input just like its rival does, in order to raise 
the optimal input price which hence increases its rival’s cost. This benefit is known 
as rent shifting effect. To capture this benefit, then the foreign firm will give up 
saving the production cost. In this case, rent shifting effect outweighs cost-saving 
effect. 
 
Now, consider the case of *cc   such that firm F decides to make input by 
itself. When the input price is higher than the cost under the making regime, i.e 
 cwM  , it is  straightforward that firm F will choose to produce input by itself. 
However, there is a chance for the making regime to take place although the input 
price is lower than the cost under the making regime, that is when 
  2/1ˆ tcss  . Assume that c  is larger than t  with insignificant difference, i.e. 
 1 tc , we find sˆ  that is positive. So, we have: 
 
Proposition 2 
The foreign firm will decide to make input by itself despite the lower input price 
under the outsourcing regime if the domestic firm is being charged a positive 
export tax by the domestic government. 
 
In this case, the fact that the domestic firm incurs an export tax will motivate the 
foreign firm to make input by itself although the input price under outsourcing is 
lower. The reason is, that under outsourcing both firms buy the input from the 
uptream firm and so face a harsh competition in obtaining the input.  The foreign 
firm can instead choose to make input by itself to avoid the severe competition in 
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the upstream market. However, the foreign firm can still gain a stronger power in 
the final product market as the presence of export tax in the domestic country has 
already weakened the domestic firm market power. Alhough the domestic firm can 
enjoy a lower input price, it also suffers from the weaker competitiveness in the 
final market due to export tax. For the foreign firm, this benefit is known as 
competition effect. To capture this benefit, the foreign firm will give up saving the 
production cost. In this case, competition effect dominates cost-saving effect. 
 
In the first stage, the domestic government sets its strategic trade policy. The 
objective of the domestic government is to maximize domestic social welfare, 
which is defined as the summation the domestic firm’s profit and export tax 
revenues. Thus, the domestic country’s social welfare function under the 
outsourcing regime is given by: 
.Od
O
d
O
d sqSW    (12) 
Substituting equations (9.1) and (9.2) into (12), we can rewrite the domestic 
country’s social welfare under the outsourcing regime as follows:
 
    .275
12
1
275
12
1
2












 tsstsSWOd  (13) 
By differentiating (13) with respect to s , we obtain the optimal tax under the 
outsourcing regime as follows: 
35
25 

t
sO  (14) 
From (14) we find that the tax is negative for any positive value of t . It means 
that under the outsourcing regime the domestic government will impose a negative 
tax or subsidy on its firm. Thus, we have: 
 
 
Proposition 3 
Under the outsourcing regime, the domestic government will impose a negative 
export tax on its firm, namely subsidy. 
 
Looking back to proposition 1, subsidy for firm D is the necessary condition for 
firm F to outsource. This is confirmed by the domestic country’s social welfare 
analysis, that subsidy is also the optimal trade policy for the domestic firm when 
the foreign firm outsources its output. Since the outsourcing decision by the foreign 
firm leads to a higher input price, the domestic government will give subsidy to the 
domestic firm to help it survive in the final product market. This result is sharply in 
contrast to that of Bernhofen (1997) which finds that the government will subsidize 
the domestic firm under price discrimination and impose export tax under uniform 
pricing. 
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Under the making regime, the domestic country’s social welfare function is 
given by: 
.Md
M
d
M
d sqSW    (15) 
Substituting equations (11.1) and (11.2) into (15), we can rewrite the domestic 
country’s social welfare as follows:
 
    .2422
12
1
2422
12
1
2












 stcsstcSWMd  (16) 
By differentiating (16) with respect to s , we obtain the optimal tax under the 
making regime as follows: 
8
1

tc
sM  (17) 
For any positive c  and t , we find that the tax in (17) is positive. Hence, we 
obtain: 
 
Proposition 4 
Under the making regime, the domestic government will impose a positive 
export tax on its firm.  
 
Recall Proposition 2 that the making regime will take place if the domestic 
government imposes a positive export tax on the domestic firm. This is exactly 
what we have by analyzing from the domestic government’s point of view. We have 
known that the decision of the foreign firm to make input by itself leads to a lower 
input price. Since the domestic firm has already got benefit from this, the domestic 
government will take advantage of the trade by charging an export tax on the 
domestic firm. 
 
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Globalization has led to more integrated trade between countries and 
international outsourcing has now become more common. Nowadays businesses 
engage in purchasing intermediate inputs from affiliating foreign firms. This 
countries integration in the world economy has also led to countries engagement in 
producing final goods directly and indirectly. In facing this new era of trade, 
governments must consider welfare implications of alternative trade policies they 
take, including when they have to protect their firms and when they can take 
advantage of the international trade. 
This paper discusses strategic trade policy in a duopoly model in the presence 
of international outsourcing. In this model one firm is able to both produce and 
outsource its input while another one can only outsource its input. Both of the firm 
export the final product to another coutry. The choice of the foreign firm on 
outsourcing or making in-house input affects the trade policy of the domestic 
government. Outsourcing occurs not only for seeking cheaper input but also for 
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obtaining strategic advantage. In this paper we find that strategic advantage is 
acquired when the foreign firm chooses to outsource its input production and 
competition advantage is obtained when the foreign firm produces input by itself. In 
facing this behavior of the foreign firm, the domestic goverment must set its 
strategic trade policy. 
The results obtained are as follows. First, the foreign firm will strategically 
outsource its input despite the higher input price under the outsourcing regime, if 
the domestic firm is subsidized by the domestic government. This is because by 
outsourcing its input, the foreign firm can benefit from the rent shifting effect by 
raising its rival’s production cost. Second, The reason is that the foreign firm tries 
to lower competition in the upstream market to gain more market power in the 
downstream market. Third, under the outsourcing regime, the domestic 
government will impose a negative export tax on its firm, namely subsidy. This is 
aimed to increase the domestic firm’s competitiveness in the final product market 
as it suffers from the higher input price under the outsurcing regime. Fourth, under 
the making regime, the domestic government will impose a positive export tax on 
its firm. This is because the domestic firm has obtained benefis from the lower 
input price under the making regime, hence the domestic government will charge 
an export tax to take advantage of the international trade. In short, the condition for 
outsourcing to take place is what the domestic needs to maximize the domestic 
social welfare under the outsourcing regime, namely subsidy. Similarly, the trade 
policy that the domestic government uses to maximize the domestic social welfare 
is what the foreign firm needs to undergo the making regime. 
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